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Introduction
The terms included in the title («Great Depression» and «Great Recession») 
are being widely used to refer to the two most serious economic crises in con-
temporary world history, those initiated in 1929 and 20072 . We do not pretend 
in this article participate on the current debate about their causes or ways out . 
As the second part of the title indicates, our focus is related to industrial sector 
performance during both periods . Industry is not usually considered among the 
possible culprits of these economic downturns . Although players may have 
been different, the speculative and financial origins of the deep recessions that 
capitalist economies suffered after 1929 and 2007 are not in doubt . The atten-
tion given here to the industrial sector is justified by the very title of this journal 
and by our own interest in the subject, along with that of many of its readers . 
In any case, regardless of the causes of both crises and the channels of transmis-
sion from the financial economy to the «real» or «productive» economy, it is 
clear that in both cases industrial activity was to some extent affected by a situ-
1 . What follows is an open text . The authors intend to update it periodically by adding 
new data for the current situation (available, on completion of this article, up to July 2011) . 
These extensions would be posted on the website of the Revista de Historia Industrial (www .
ub .edu/rhi/) .
2 . As far as we know, only Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff have suggested an al-
ternative term to the «Great Recession» – the «Second Great Contraction» – which not only 
directly links current economic events to those of the 1930s (the «First Great Contraction», of 
course) but also implies that today’s financial and economic crisis should be considered in a dif-
ferent way (and as something much more serious than a recession) . Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) . 
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ation originated in different and distant areas (economically  and geographical-
ly) . At least that is what has happened in the most developed economies accord-
ingly to indicators such as industrial production indices (IPIs), rates of 
investment, demand behaviour, business sector density or employment levels .
Of these variables, this article will focus on the first: the course followed 
by IPIs in both situations (the Great Depression and the Great Recession) . As 
we note in more detail later on, this is not an original exercise – although we 
hope that it will be useful enough to reach a valid conclusion about the role 
played by the industrial sector (especially the manufacturing subsector) in this 
type of crisis3 . The comparison will be made at world level and for selected 
countries, including the most industrialized and some of the so-called ‘emerg-
ing’ . Spanish case has been also included in this comparison .
Preliminary considerations
Our comparative and industrialist approach requires contextualization . 
Prior to begin the analysis, we have to consider the differences between the 
two periods in three relevant aspects: prevailing technological paradigms, 
weight of the industrial sector on the economy, and world distribution of 
manufacturing activities . 
Regarding to technological paradigms, the interwar period coincided with 
the culmination of the Second Industrial Revolution, i .e . when the breakdown 
innovations on manufacturing and energy that had sprung up in the final dec-
ades of the 19th century were reaching maturity: new chemical and metallur-
gical technologies, electricity, automobiles, etc . The difference with regard to 
today’s situation is significant for a number of reasons . Firstly, the current 
technological paradigm (the so-called Third Industrial Revolution) is at a 
more incipient stage in 2007 than the Second was in 1929 . Despite the recent 
growth of the technology and human capital intensive branches, the leading 
industries of the second paradigm still contribute the most to the total indus-
trial added value and to worldwide manufacturing trade4 . An even more ex-
3 . The last few years have been published several studies comparing the 1929 crisis and 
that of 2007/2008 . These range from those which cast doubts on the viability of this type of 
analysis – see Schlenkhoff (2010), for example – to those which, accepting the academic legiti-
macy of such an approach, focus on specific aspects, like fiscal and monetary policies, the fate 
of financial intermediaries or the ways of the spread of the crisis . Most of them focus on the 
main economic indicators (e .g . the evolution of GDP or exports and imports) . Some of the most 
useful of these comparative approaches are those by Aiginger (2010), Almunia et al . (2010), 
Crafts & Fearon (2010), Gros & Alcidi (2009), Grossman & Meissner (2010), Mitchener & Ma-
son (2010), Romer (2009) and Temin (2010) .
4 . There are large differences on industry structure between emerging and advanced 
economies . In the former, the most technologically complex sectors contribute with rates of 
over 25% of the added value, while in the latter the figure is fewer than 10% . Manufacturing in 
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treme and worrying phenomenon is affecting energy . At most capitalist econo-
mies, energy consumption is still dominated by fossil fuels (coal and especially 
oil) . The necessary commitment to cheap, clean energy based on renewable re-
sources is no more than a pledge for the future . Right now in both developed 
and emerging economies, renewable energy (in particular wind and solar ener-
gy) accounts for barely 10% of final energy consumption5 .
Secondly we have to look at the weight of the industrial sector within the 
economy, a weight that is today significantly different than eight decades ago . 
Summarizing briefly, in the 1920s the capitalist economies were advancing to-
wards the status of industrialized economies –with the secondary sector lead-
ing total added value and employment – a situation they reached after the 
Second World War but which was already close on the eve of the Great De-
pression . Nowadays, however, all the advanced countries are tertiary econo-
mies (in sociological terms, post-industrial societies) in which the service sec-
tor absorbs most working resources and contributes the highest percentages 
to GDP .
Figure 1 shows how between 1967 (with the second technological revolu-
tion in full swing) and 2007 (on the eve of the Great Recession and with the 
third revolution at their beginnings), the secondary sector’s contribution to 
world GDP fell by over ten points, dropping from a little over 38% to just un-
der 28% . If  we extend the period further into the past, we find a starting point 
at the end of 19th century fairly similar to the situation at the beginning of the 
21st in terms of both industrial contribution to GDP and to employment . In 
the United States, Japan and Western Europe the two variables fluctuate 
– then and now – around the 25% mark (about three points below the world 
average as shown in Figure 1), although with one important difference: the 
first phase was at the upwards slope of an inverted U, and the second at its 
downwards slope . The industry’s highest weight in terms of GDP and em-
ployment (between 40% and 45%) were reached by the most advanced coun-
tries between 1950 and 19706 .
Briefly, the economies which in the course of  the 19th century experi-
enced the first and second industrial revolutions are today in the way to dein-
dustrialization . Although most of  them still occupy the top positions in the 
the richer countries is still dominated by activities of low and medium technological complex-
ity, while new industrialized ones give priority to the more advanced technologies . As regards 
world trade, in 2007 the value of manufactured products within total exports had already 
reached 69 .8% . Chemical products, cars, equipment and transport material, iron and steel 
goods and textiles – all manufacturing branches corresponding to the first and second indus-
trial revolutions – accounted for over three-quarters of this figure . See CPB . Economic Policy 
Analysis . World Trade Monitor, December 2010 .
5 . This has just reached 13% in Spain as we write . Renewable energies are already the 
main source of electricity generation .
6 . See Parejo, Sudrià & Tirado (2010) .
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world in terms of  per capita income, the changes undergone by their produc-
tive  economy in the last decades can only be described as radical . The agri-
cultural sector has ended up becoming virtually residual (with barely 5% of 
employment and added value) . The secondary sector, which is what concerns 
us in this article, although still maintains a relatively significant contribution 
to workforce and GDP in all advanced economies, had reduced too its levels 
in the last three or four decades . Services have benefited from both reduc-
tions .
Nevertheless, we have to be careful with terminology . «Deindustrializa-
tion» in particular is an extraordinarily ambiguous term: industrial historians 
tend to use it to describe terminal processes, usually of a regional or local 
character, that finally led to a situation of generalized economic crisis . How-
ever, this correspondence between industrial decay and economic contraction 
has lost its previous validity, at least referred to countries as a whole7 . This is 
7 . The view would be different if  we use industrial districts or local production systems 
as units of analysis . In this case the typology may vary greatly, although generally speaking 
those areas that have remained bound to the second technological paradigm are finding it very 
difficult to grow or even survive (Detroit being a case in point), while those which evolved to-
wards the third technological paradigm or originated it are coming through the Great Reces-
sion with better results (Silicon Valley would be an example still within the United States) . As 
far as Spain is concerned, another example may illustrate the situation more clearly . The com-
panies located in the Parque Tecnológico in Andalusia (all of them attached to the third tech-
FIGURE 1 ▪ Contribution of the industrial sector to world GDP 1967-2007 (%)
Source: World Bank.
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the case for the rich countries in the period considered in the previous figure, 
where deindustrialization has come about through the transfer of workforce 
and added value to other sectors (particularly the tertiary sector), but without 
this phenomenon implying a lost in terms of income or welfare . 
This transition towards a service-based economy has come about alongside 
the gradual disappearance of the frontiers between sectors . Right now it is dif-
ficult to know where extractive or agricultural activities end and manufactur-
ing activities begin, and then at what point services replace manufacture . This 
is just one good reason among others for rethinking the utility of the analytical 
tools proposed by Colin Clark, with three independent large-scale production 
sectors . It may well have been suitable for studying the first and second techno-
logical revolutions, but it is not suitable for analyzing the third .
A third and final distinctive feature remains to be considered . It is just as 
important as the previous two: the world distribution of the industrial prod-
uct . The Great Depression came about after a period which saw the unstop-
pable rise of the United States towards the industrial leadership of the world . 
Around 1930 approximately 42% of the world’s entire industrial product was 
generated there, placing the United States well above Britain (9 .4%), Germa-
ny (11 .6%) and France (6 .5%) . The United States boom contributed to rise 
the concentration of industrial activity towards an exceedingly high level on 
the eve of the 1930s . At that time the four countries mentioned above ac-
counted for almost 70% of the entire world industrial product, a percentage 
that went up by another ten points if  we add other European countries now 
integrated in the European Union .
The indisputable western (US-European) dominance of the 1920s has giv-
en way to a much more balanced situation at the start of the third millennium . 
Table 1 shows the world distribution of the industrial product in 2007 . Al-
though the leading role of the countries of the First and Second Industrial 
Revolutions is still important (about 42% is accounted for by Western Eu-
rope-United States), the former hegemony is beginning to appear less secure 
due to the emergence of Asian countries, among which China’s prominence is 
becoming more and more relevant . Obviously the previous distribution also 
states the extreme industrial weakness of the rest of the world, especially Af-
rica and central Asia, the only exceptions being Australia and New Zealand in 
Oceania along with a few Latin American countries such as Brazil and to a 
less extent Chile, Argentina and Mexico .
nological paradigm) are the only ones that have managed to create jobs (at an annual rate of 
over 1,000 contracts) in a province – Malaga – where the consequences of the crisis on employ-
ment have been the worst of Spain (in mid-2011 the unemployment rate was over 30%) . For a 
recent analysis see Catalan, Miranda & Ramón, eds . (2011) .
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The world distribution of industrial product shown in Table 1 can be 
rounded off  with a mention of a related variable: foreign trade . Specifically, 
Table 2 compares the distribution of manufacturing exports by continent in 
the periods immediately preceding the start of the Great Depression (1928) 
and the Great Recession (2007) .
Comparing the figures in Table 2 with those of location of the industrial 
activities not really significant differences can be found, especially if  we take 
into account the fact that behind each continental group there is a small 
number of countries: the big three European industrial economies account 
for most of «Europe» and the United States for almost 25% of «America» at 
both dates . As in industrial added value, the dominance of the North Ameri-
can-Western European axis remains in place as far as exports are concerned . 
The loss of just over eleven points (from 77 .6% to 66 .2%) after eight decades, 
basically in favor of the Chinese economy, being significant, does not justify 
TABLE 1 ▪ World distribution of industrial product (%) at the start of the Great Recession
European Union  20.2
East and Central Europe  5.0
United States  21.7
Latin America  6.4
Japan  11.6
China  9.2
Rest of Asia  17.0
Africa and Middle East  6.5
Rest of the World  2.4
World  100.0
Source: International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics 2007.
TABLE 2 ▪ World distribution of manufacturing exports (by continent) in 1928 and 2007
1928 2007
Europe  47.0  38.8
America  30.6  29.6
Asia  15.5  25.0
Africa  4.0  2.5
Oceania  2.9  4.1
Source: see text.
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the conclusion that the export model led by the most advanced economies 
since the end of the 19th century has been overthrown8 .
Financial crises and industrial slumps
To begin this comparative study of the biggest industrial crises of the last 
hundred years it is worth to recall the leading role played by cycles in the evo-
lution of contemporary capitalism . As we know, western economic history of 
the last two centuries includes not only periods of expansion but also others 
marked by deep contractions in productive activity . These medium and long-
term cycles were already described in the second half of the 19th century and 
the first decades of the 20th by scholars like Juglar, Kitchin, or Kondratieff . 
Since then, the study of economic cycles has generated a wide-ranging litera-
ture with a number of theoretical models concerned with their role in econom-
ic growth that coexist, not always comfortably9 . These approaches tend to dis-
appear from the historiographic literature for decades only to return from time 
to time, almost always during periods of recession or depression such as to-
day’s . Since 1873 at least, the most serious crises involving the secondary sector 
– these in which the destruction of the business and the loss of jobs reached the 
greatest proportions – have shown a similar aetiology and development10 . As 
mentioned earlier, the typical process usually includes a financial and/or specu-
lative crisis originated in a particular country, with each cyclical episode start-
ing in one of the biggest western economies: in chronological order, Great Brit-
ain, Germany and the United States . The crisis then spreads in an irregular 
way both geographically and by sector (i .e . to other capitalist economies and 
other productive activities), without the course followed or the repercussions 
necessarily having to be similar in each country or sector .  
The contagion, at least since the end of the 19th century, can be explained 
by the gradual integration of national and international markets which ini-
tially brought about the transport revolution, and had an immediate effect on 
the mobility of production factors, work and capital . This mobility, already 
detected in the first globalization (from the 1870s) and reinforced during the 
second (from the last decade of the 20th century onwards), has had a definite 
 8 . The data come from the World Trade Organization website: www .omc .org (www .wto .
org) .
 9 . A recent summary of the role of economic cycles according to various economic the-
ories can be found in Korotayev & Tsirel, (2010) . See also classic studies such as Schumpeter 
(1939), Kuznets (1966) and Maddison (1991) .
10 . A detailed analysis of the financial crises of capitalism (most involving an industrial 
dimension of some importance) can be found in a number of recently published books: Oliver 
& Aldcroft (2007), Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) and Marichal (2010) . In a book which today is a 
classic, Kindleberger (1978) also dealt with these crises from a historical perspective .
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effect in those branches of manufacturing most closely linked to foreign mar-
kets or intensive in the use of technology and human capital .
Generally speaking, the sequence we have just summarized is similar to 
that described by the literature devoted to the contraction periods we are in-
terested in: the 1929 crisis and the financial crisis of 2007 . This last event, 
however, has also generated a kind of bibliography almost absent from previ-
ous downturns: the comparison between a process already finished and ex-
haustively analyzed by economists and economic historians (the crash of 
1929 and the subsequent Great Depression) and the current crisis, still ongo-
ing and with an uncertain prognosis11 . 
These comparative exercises have shown the similarities between both pe-
riods of depression, and at the same time have served to test whether the argu-
ments used to understand the first crisis may be useful for a better knowledge 
of the second, in the hope to find a possible way out from the current situa-
tion . From this point of view, it is significant – especially for our field – that 
two of the leading experts on the Great Depression (Ben Bernanke and Chris-
tina Romer) have held posts of political and economic responsibility in the 
country where both downturns originated12 . This has all contributed decisive-
ly not only to the generally welcome proliferation of this type of comparison 
but also, and much more important, to the fact that some of the many errors 
committed in the 1930s with regard to monetary and trade policy have been 
avoided . The lessons of the consequences of a too tight monetary policy (re-
lated to the adherence to the Gold Standard) and of a global increase on tar-
iffs have been learned13 . 
There are two points that studies comparing the crises beginning in 1929 
and 2007 have confirmed14 . The first refers to the different severity of both 
downturns . If  we use the same calendar as that adopted by this article (June 
1929/July 1933; June 2007/July 2011), the behaviour of the big aggregates was 
 
11 . In spite of have been widely studied, the debate on the origins, evolution, and end of 
the Great Depression continue as vivid as always . Some of the most recent and brilliant contri-
butions can be found in Bernanke (2004), Eggertsson (2008) and (2009), Ohanian (2009) and 
Wolf (2010) . All these studies include extensive bibliographies for a subject that continues to at-
tract the interest of many specialists . In addition, some of the classic books on the Great De-
pression, such those by Kindleberger (1985), Temin (1989) and Galbraith (2008), are still very 
useful .
12 . The former as Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, replacing Alan Greenspan; 
the latter as head of President Obama’s council of economic advisors until she resigned in Au-
gust 2010 .
13 . As well as the articles listed in footnote 9, recent contributions on both aspects can 
be found in Eichengreen (2010), Fishback (2010), Mathy & Meissner (2011) and Wolf (2008) . 
The various time scales and speeds involved in overcoming the crisis along with its causes are 
dealt specifically by Badger (1989), Steindl (2007) and Hatton & Thomas (2010) . The crisis in 
Europe is analysed by Feinstein, Temin & Toniolo (1997) and Clavin (2000) among others . 
14 . See the articles cited in footnote 3 .
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much more negative in the first episode than in the current one . We only have 
to look at the indicators shown in Table 3 to see that the Great Depression in-
volved far more negative figures than those presented over the last four years 
by the Great Recession . Although in both cases most of the data refers to the 
United States (the origin of both crises), these figures are similar to those of 
most other advanced economies in the world .
A second consideration also derives from figures included in the table 
above . Here we have two episodes which, apart from taking place in very dif-
ferent social and economic frameworks, present a number of different if  not 
opposing characteristics . To mention only a few, there is the deflationary na-
ture of the Great Depression, the extraordinary contraction of world trade 
which took place in the 1930s (possibly the variable that contrasts most with 
the current situation) and of course the unemployment situation, which was 
not only much higher then – leaving aside the untypical case of Spain – but 
also had a much more devastating effect on societies that had no social protec-
tion mechanisms .
The dynamics of industrial contraction
After those preliminary remarks, we are ready to present our work . Of 
the various comparative projects that have appeared over the last four years, 
the most interesting to readers of  the Revista de Historia Industrial and the 
closest to the approach we propose here is the one begun in 2008 by Barry 
Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke with the evocative Dickensian title of  «A 
Tale of  Two Depressions»15 . Their goal was to present a comparative analysis 
15 . www .voxeu .org .
TABLE 3 ▪ Macroeconomic variables in the Great Depression (1929-1933) and the Great 
Recession (2007-2011) 
Great 
Depression
Great 
Recession
1. United States. GDP change (%) -26.5 -5.61
2. United States. Money supply change (%) -17 +12.5
3. United States. Bank failures (number and  % of total banks) 9,096 (50%) 57 (0.6%)
4. World international trade. Change (%) -65 +5.1
5. Advanced economies. Prices change (%) -25 +0.5
6. Advanced economies. Average unemployment rate (%) 25.4 8.5
Source: see text.
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of different macroeconomic variables (GDP, world trade) including the be-
haviour of  industrial production during the months following June 1929 and 
April 2008, dates which the authors consider seminal to the onset of  both 
downturns . To analyze this behaviour, Eichengreen and O’Rourke used 
monthly industrial production indices for the world total along with specific 
figures for the most industrialized countries . For the first crisis the analysis 
spanned for fifty months, to July 1933; for the second, if  we use identical time 
scale, the last month considered should have been May 2012 . Eichengreen 
and O’Rourke made several actualizations of  their data but the last one was 
presented over a year and a half  ago, which means that their analysis on the 
current crises stops on February 2010 .
Our main goal is to extend the exercise begun in «A Tale...», in two ways: 
expanding the database until the last available figures and introducing some 
additional variables that Eichengreen and O’Rourke did not considered . The 
aim is to provide a more balanced picture than that obtained from observing 
the movements of the IPI in the short term . More precisely our exercise con-
tains three novelties with respect to «A Tale...»:
FIGURE 2 ▪ Monthly indices for world industrial production according to Barry 
Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, June 1929-July 1933 and April 2008-February 2010
Source: see text.
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a)  The short-term analysis is maintained at fifty months, which does not 
affect the chronology used for the first crisis and the Great Depression 
(from June 1929 to July 1933 inclusive) but does affect the used for the 
current one . As already mentioned, the analysis in «A Tale . . .» cuts off  
in February 2010, having reached only the twentieth month out of the 
theoretical fifty . To partially avoid this problem, we bring backwards 
the start of the monthly series corresponding to the 21st century, mov-
ing it from April 2008 to June 2007, a date closer to that now consid-
ered to be the onset of the US speculative/financial crisis16 . Bringing 
backwards the series constructed by Eichengreen and O’Rourke also 
means that the fiftieth observation now coincides with the latest avail-
able estimation at the time of writing (July 2011) .
b) Along with the short term perspective, we introduce a medium-term 
analysis capable of providing a framework for both crises on a wider 
time scale . For the first episode we take from the end of the First World 
War (1920) to the beginning of the Second (1940); and for the second 
one, from the middle of the last decade of the 20th century to the early 
years of the second decade of the 21st (1995-2013), which of course 
means that we have had to use the latest available forecasts for indus-
trial product growth for the next two and a half  years .
 Knowing the variability of the IPIs, we believe that to add this wider 
perspective is worth, even though it has meant dealing simultaneously 
with highly aggregated (monthly but for the world as a whole) and dis-
aggregated  (annual and by country) data . We hope that the short and 
medium time perspectives (fifty months and twenty years) will enrich 
each other .
c)  Finally, whereas in «A Tale . . .» the accent was on the worldwide per-
formance of the industrial production index, here we are also dealing 
with regions and countries17 .
The result of adjusting Eichengreen and O’Rourke’s series is shown in Fig-
ure 3 . This is the most aggregated of the possible estimations: the evolution of 
the world industrial production index for fifty months starting from June 1929 
and June 2007 . The graph highlights the differences between the two downturns 
for industrial activity . As far as the secondary sector is concerned, the Great De-
pression was much more serious than the Great Recession has been so far . Note 
16 . Although there is no definitive consensus among experts as to the onset of the finan-
cial crisis, most of them put its origins at mid-2007, an intermediate date between February, 
when the Federal Reserve first warned of the problems involved with subprime mortgages, and 
December, when the United States technically entered into recession .
17 . «A Tale . . .» did in fact include data of the IPIs of the major industrialized economies, 
but the last estimation published was that of September 2009 .
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that in the fifty months considered between 1929 and 1933, not only was the 
starting figure not regained (the IPI for the summer of the second year cited 
barely reached 80), but it even fell by as far as 40% in the final months of 1932, 
something that has not happened in the months that have gone by between June 
2007 and July 2011 . Indeed the world IPI continued to grow until October 2008 
(although at a moderate rate) and then fell below the starting figure throughout 
the following year . But in December 2009 it had again regained the starting 
point, increasing vigorously until at least the spring of 2011, to become much 
less dynamic afterwards, according to last available data .
At this point we should remind several remarks already noted, especially 
differences on the weight of the industrial sector within the economy and on 
spatial concentration of the manufacturing activities between one situation 
and the other . Only by taking these factors into account can be accurately ap-
proached this highly aggregated data . The fall and subsequent recovery of the 
1930s was closely linked to the fate of the most industrialized and richest 
countries in the world, headed by the United States, while in the recent years 
both the milder contraction and the strong subsequent recovery is directly re-
lated with the course followed by the so-called emerging economies, identified 
as the group formed by the four BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and 
FIGURE 3 ▪ Monthly world industrial production indices, June 1929 to July 1933 
and June 2007 to July 2011 (June 1929 and June 2007=100) (months 1 to 50)
Source: see text.
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FIGURE 4 ▪  Monthly industrial production indices (June 1929 and June 2007 = 100)
a) June 1929-June 1933
b) June 2007-July 2011
Source: see text.
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China), those Asian countries whose development began earlier (South Ko-
rea, Singapore and Taiwan), a few Latin American and African countries 
such as Argentina, Chile, and South Africa . 
This is why, when we move from world total to data by country, the view 
of both crises becomes more precise . We have already noted the extremely 
high level of concentration of manufacturing activity in the early decades of 
the 20th century . Now Figure 4a shows the pathway followed by the four 
countries mentioned earlier (the United States, Great Britain, Germany and 
France), which at that time accounted for around 70% of the world’s indus-
trial product .
If we remember that the United States alone accounted for 42% of world-
wide industrial added value, we should not be surprised by the similarity be-
tween the series for the US and that for the world . However, it may be surpris-
ing to see the variety of situations brought about by the crisis in the secondary 
sector of the most industrialized countries of Europe . In this respect three fea-
tures stand out and, despite being well known, worth to be highlighted: the low 
impact of the crisis on British industry, the big difference between Germany 
and France on the onset date of the recession (that same summer of 1929 for 
Germany and the autumn of 1930 for France); and the strength of the German 
recovery from the end of 1932 onwards . 
The Spanish case allows us to enrich our discussion . During the years fol-
lowing the crash, Spanish industry – which then accounted for barely 1% of 
world production – withstood the effects of the crisis until the summer of 1931, 
when it began to fall at very moderate rate . Hence the Spanish monthly IPI for 
these fifty months showed an annual rate of growth (-1 .18), quite better than 
the world average (-5 .44) . 
So, what is happening in the current crisis? The disaggregation of the 
world index into two big regional units – advanced economies (the thirty 
OECD countries) and emerging economies (the BRICs) – allows to explain 
the unusual nature of the IPIs’ most recent course . The main point is the dif-
ferent behaviour which the emerging economies are exhibiting compared to 
the old industrialized countries (Figure 5) . As can be observed, in the latter 
countries industrial contraction begun in 2008 and was at first even more in-
tense than that experienced after June 1929 . Fortunately, it stopped before 
worsen further, but only when it had already reached almost 20% in these 
countries . Recovery has also been weaker than in the emerging economies: at 
July 2011 highest income countries have still not returned to the levels of in-
dustrial production previous to the beginning of the contraction .
This first approach can be made more specific if  we move from regional 
blocks to individual countries . Panel b) in Figure 4 shows the evolution of the 
IPIs between June 2007 and July 2011 of the same industrialized economies 
studied for the 1930s . Having both groups of series in the same figure and on 
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the same scale allows us to compare the evolution of each country in either 
periods or that of various countries in every period . It can be seen that there 
are some quite significant differences; we could almost be talking about op-
posing behaviours . First we should highlight that dispersion among advanced 
countries was much more intense in the 1930s than in the current crisis, no 
doubt as a result of the greater degree of international economic integration 
and the existence today of a greater coordination of country specific econom-
ic policies . 
Looking now at individual countries data, we see that in the 1930s there 
were three countries that initially evolved above the world average (France, 
Spain and Great Britain) and another two (the United States and Germany) 
that did remain close to it . In the process that began in June 2007, Germany 
was also initially the most affected country (alongside with Spain), with a 
stronger contraction than the world and the other advanced countries until 
early 2009 . In fact, we can say that, despite than the crisis blew up first in US 
and somewhat in Britain, the magnitude of the industrial downturn during its 
most acute stage (April 2008-April 2009) was significantly greater in the coun-
tries of continental Europe: a cumulative 20% as opposed to 15% in the Unit-
FIGURE 5 ▪ Monthly industrial production indices, June 2007 to July 2011
(June 2007=100)
Source: www.ocde.org/www.oecd.org
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ed States and Great Britain . The recovery also has some unusual features . The 
most striking is again the greater intensity of the improvement in Germany . 
Like in the 1930s, after being one of the European countries most affected by 
the contraction, it is also the one with the most intense recovery, up to the 
point that, according the last available data, it has recovered the initial level of 
industrial production, something the other countries analysed have yet to 
reach . In this context the case of Spain takes on an unusual dimension . Quite 
unlike what happened in the first crisis, the initial impact of the current con-
traction on Spanish industry has been similar to that reported for the most 
advanced countries – a loss of approximately 20% . What is unusual in this 
case is the recovery, which is simply non-existent in Spain . While our French 
and German partners have recouped between 10 and 15 percentage points of 
the losses on their industrial production,  Spain’s has remained virtually stag-
nant . This is something that threatens to eliminate the effects of the celebrated 
convergence process of the last two decades .
The two crises in perspective
We move now from short to medium term analysis, with the aim to weigh 
up more accurately the depth of  both industrial crises in their respective his-
torical context . As so far, we will use the IPI as the main variable, but in this 
case the yearly rate . The coverage will include two almost complete decades 
in each case: 1917-1935 for the Great Depression and 1995-2013 for the Great 
Recession . Just as in the previous section, we will first present the most ag-
gregated data to move then to analyse regional blocks and countries . We 
have set base in the two years (1929 and 2007) which saw the start of  both 
contractions . In the case of  the Great Depression the period considered 
starts while the First World War was still in progress and finishes in 1935, 
while for the current contraction it begins in 1995 and must necessarily in-
clude two years (2012 and 2013) for which at present we have only highly un-
reliable forecasts .
Figure 6 shows the evolution of world IPI in the two periods mentioned 
above . Again it is clear that the crisis of the 1930s was deeper than the current 
one . What this approach adds to our view, is that both crisis came about after 
a phase of sustained growth in the industrial product, more intense and with 
bigger fluctuations in the 1920s than in the decades that preceded the current 
crisis . The greater instability of the first phase must be related with the con-
flicting political and social atmosphere that remained after the First World 
War . Nevertheless, it is still significant that the industrial expansion associat-
ed with the spread of the second technological revolution was much more in-
tense than that set in motion by the third . The above cited differences on the 
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stage of development of each revolution when the respective crises erupted, 
could explain this diverse evolution .
However, we should again recall that the two indices involve very different 
degrees of industry concentration and of its weight on the economy . In other 
words the identification of rich countries with industrialized countries and 
the preponderance of the manufacturing sector in the economy have definite-
ly become weakened between one phase and the other . 
Figure 7 compares the IPIs of the most developed countries (and Spain) 
for both phases . If  we look at the first, the most striking feature we can ob-
serve is the ample difference among the growth paths followed by the coun-
tries . Growth rates for the decade preceding the 1929 crash, range from the 
very high of France (7 .26%) and Germany (6 .33%), to the moderate of the 
United States (3 .94%) and Great Britain (2 .32%) . Spain, being then a much 
less industrialized country, achieved a remarkable 5% . It should not be forgot-
ten, however, that the impact of the war was different in each country . Ger-
many, for example, did not recover its pre-conflict level of industrial produc-
tion until 1924 and underwent extremely irregular growth throughout the 
1920s .
FIGURE 6 ▪ Annual industrial production indices 1917-1935 and 1995-2013
(1929 and 2007=100)
Source: see text
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FIGURE 7 ▪  Annual industrial production indices for the four most industrialized 
countries and Spain (1920-1940) 1929=100.
a) 1920-1940
b) 1995-2013
Source: see text
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The fall of industrial production after 1929 was general, and lasted until 
1933 . From that year until the out break of the Second World War evolution 
was very different for each of the countries studied . While industrial produc-
tion in Germany grew at an extraordinarily high rate (9 .5% annually) between 
Hitler’s ascent to power and the start of the war, in the United States the re-
covery was interrupted by the recession of 1937/38 to restart again more 
strongly thereafter18 . Between 1933, when Roosevelt was installed, and 1940, 
the overall annual growth rate reached the 8% . France and Great Britain, on 
their part, reversed the policies they followed before the crash of 1929 . France 
decided to remain tied to the gold standard, and suffered an almost total stag-
nation of its industrial production (with the annual rate barely reaching 0 .02% 
between 1932 and 1938), while Great Britain achieved sustained growth, ex-
ceeding 4 .45% annual between 1932 and 193819 .
As these were industrialized economies, the evolution of  the IPIs was 
very similar to other main indices (the rates for economic growth and em-
ployment, for instance) in the interwar period . We can verify this relation-
ship looking at the industry unemployment rates for the same period (Fig-
ure 8) . As we can see, industrial employment underwent somewhat sharper 
fluctuations than production, which would confirm that employment is al-
ways the first victim of  any economic contraction . Broadly speaking, how-
ever, the United States along with Great Britain, France and Germany cre-
ated or destroyed employment at a similar rate to which their industrial 
product grew or diminished .
The comparison shows also that Spanish industry followed the same path 
than the world average and the most industrialized economies until the end of 
the 1920s . As we already know, during the years following the crash Spain per-
formed quite better than the average, a relatively satisfactory evolution that 
was cut short by the outbreak of the Civil War . The conflict and the autarkic 
economic policy embraced by the francoist regime afterwards postponed the 
recovery for more than a decade . Spain’s industrial production index would 
not recover its 1929 level until 195020 .
Let us move now to the current downturn . Figure 7b shows the evolution 
of the industrial production for the countries already considered from 1995 to 
2013 . Annual data confirms that the current crisis has had less impact in the 
industrial sector that that of the 1930s, and also that both of them came about 
18 . About Hitler’s industrial policy, see Hardarch (1984), James (1989) and Overy (1994) . 
On the U .S . depression of 1937/38, see Badger (1989) and Chapter 6 of Steindl (2004) .
19 . During the 1920s France had better macroeconomic indicators than Great Britain, a 
situation that would change noticeably in the following decade . The comparative economic 
courses of both countries in the interwar period can be followed in Feinstein, Temin & Toniolo 
(1997) and Clavin (2000) .
20 . The most recent approach on the Spanish industry ups and downs in this period can 
be found in Sudrià, Parejo & Tirado (2010) .
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after stages of global growth . Nevertheless this assertion needs to be quali-
fied . As we have already seen, during the latest crises, the most advanced 
countries had experienced a less intense growth and a much deeper contrac-
tion than the world average . Only with regard to the United States and Ger-
many can it be said that there was a previous period of industrial expansion . 
Neither Great Britain nor France showed significant rates of industrial 
growth, and Spain to only a small extent . The impact of the contraction has 
been generalized and considerable, but the perspective is still too short to as-
sess the medium-term effects .
To finish up, Figure 9 shows the monthly data for a similar period (1992-
2011) but for three groups of countries: the world as a whole, the advanced 
economies and the emerging economies . This last graph recalls us that until 
2000 – the year of the dot .com crisis – the growth rate of the three IPIs was very 
similar, just slightly higher than the world average in the most industrialized 
countries and slightly less in the emerging countries . From that year on the evo-
lution has been completely different . The distances between both groups of 
countries have constantly grown, but on this occasion in favour of the emerging 
economies . Between 2000 and 2011, industrial product growth for the latter has 
approached 7 .5% as opposed to only 0 .5% for the advanced economies .
FIGURE 8 ▪ Industrial unemployment in the four most industrialized countries 
(% of total workforce) 1920-1940
Source: Eichengreen & Hatton (1988).
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Conclusions
The comparative exercise carried out in this article was directed  to check 
the behaviour of the most synthetic and aggregated indicator available for the 
manufacturing sector (the IPI) during the two most critical situations on con-
temporary capitalism history . The main aim was to update the data compiled 
by Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke in a serie of contributions availa-
ble on the voxEU website (www .voxeu .org) . Their comparative analysis of the 
monthly industrial production indices over the fifty months following June 
1929 and April 2008 was interrupted in February 2010 . It is extended here to 
cover another year and has been adjusted by bringing backwards the starting 
date of the second downturn analysed (from April 2008 to June 2007) .
The results obtained generally confirm what was noted by Eichengreen and 
O’Rourke and are similar to those reached by other authors who have dealt 
with variables relating to industrial activity for the dates analysed . As far as the 
triggering factors are concerned, we wanted to highlight in our work two ele-
ments which we think should be incorporated into the debate: the actual evolu-
tion of the industrial sector (especially the manufacturing subsector) in the 
years preceding each crisis and the stage of development of the prevailing tech-
FIGURE 9 ▪ Monthly industrial production indices 1992-2011 (2000=100)
Source: see text.
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nological paradigm when the productive contraction came about . Neither 
should we forget the transformations the world economy underwent between 
the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession of first decade of 
the 21st century . Of these transformations, there are at least two fundamental 
ones that we need to take into account when weighing up the results of our 
comparative exercise: a) the transition from an industrialized economy to a 
service-based one, and b) the changes in economic leadership (industrial in this 
case) at world level . In both cases it should be stressed that significant if  not 
radical changes have come about . About the deindustrialization process, it is 
worthy to note that, although the decrease in the contribution to GDP and em-
ployment is undeniable, within the framework of the third technological revo-
lution, activities considered as tertiary in official classifications should strictly 
speaking be included in the secondary sector21 . As regards territorial location, 
the emergence of different economies in Asia and Latin America (China and 
Brazil above all others) has not prevented the United States, the European Un-
ion and Japan from continuing, at the beginning of the third millennium, to 
maintain their leadership as the world’s great industrial powers, a position that 
only Chinese expansion seems capable of upsetting in the short term .
We also believe that the comparative analysis should not exclude a study 
of the influence that one crisis may have had on the other . The main connect-
ing line in this case would certainly be economic policy . There is wide consen-
sus that the experience of the Great Depression, and the studies and debates 
around it, have turned out to be useful, if  only for preventing the same serious 
mistakes that were made in the 1930s from being made in the fight against the 
Great Recession . We refer especially to monetary policy (we should not forget 
the deflationary nature of the Great Depression and the role played then by 
monetary orthodoxy), trade policy (we need to remember that between 1929 
and 1932 protectionist policies contributed decisively to collapse of world 
trade), and employment policy (in the most industrialized countries unem-
ployment then stood at about 25%, with peaks of 35% and 40% in the United 
States and Germany, whereas now it is around 8 .5%) .
Finally we would like to mention the singularity of the evolution of Span-
ish industry during these critical periods . Conversely to the other advanced 
countries, Spain has been more adversely affected by the current crisis than it 
was for the Great Depression . This singularity not only affects industrial pro-
duction, but also investment, domestic consumption, and especially employ-
ment .  Unemployment is now much higher in Spain than in other countries 
with similar levels of income and industrialization . As is well known, the un-
employment rate in Spain in early 2010 was twice that of the eurozone: 19% 
as opposed to 9%, and continues to worse .
21 .  This question is dealt in detail by Parejo (2010) for the Spanish case .
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Note on sources
The IPIs used in this article come from the following statistical sources . 
For the period 1920-1940: Wall (1936), Miron & Romer (1989), Mitchell 
(2007), Anuario Estadístico (Yearbook of Statistics) de España (1934) and 
Carreras (2005) . For the period 1991-2011, data have been gathered from the 
websites of Eurostat, INE, Thomson Reuters DataStream, the International 
Yearbooks of Industrial Statistics and VoxEu .
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■
«The Great Depression» versus «The Great Recession». Financial crashes 
and industrial slumps 
abStraCt
This article analyzes and compares the performance of the industrial sector during the 
«Great Depression» of the 1930s and the «Great Recession» that began in 2007 using the best 
available synthetic indicator, the Index of Industrial Production . The main objective is to up-
date and extend the exercise presented by Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke in 2009 and 
2010 in the voxEU website . In addition to extending the analysis of the «Great Recession» with 
the latest monthly figures available for the world as a whole, we have introduced regional and 
country level analysis, and also a broader view using annual data for periods of around twenty 
years . The results generally confirm what was observed by Eichengreen and O’Rourke and 
other authors who have dealt with industrial activity . However, our approach emphasizes two 
elements that we believe should be incorporated into the debate: the actual development of the 
industrial sector (especially the manufacturing subsector) in the years preceding each crisis and 
the stage of development of the prevailing technological paradigm when the productive con-
traction occurred .
Key wordS: Comparative Economic History, Industrial Activity, Great Depression, Great 
Recession . JEL Codes: N-10, E-23, N-60 .
■
La «Gran Depresión» versus la «Gran Recesión». Cracs financieros y crisis 
industriales
reSumen
Este artículo analiza y compara la evolución del sector industrial durante la «Gran Depre-
sión» de la década de 1930 y la «Gran Recesión» que comenzó en 2007, utilizando el mejor in-
dicador sintético disponible, el Índice de la Producción Industrial . El objetivo principal es ac-
tualizar y ampliar el ejercicio presentado por Barry Eichengreen y Kevin O’Rourke en 2009 y 
2010 en el sitio web voxEU . Además de ampliar el análisis de la «Gran Recesión» con los últi-
mos datos mensuales disponibles a nivel mundial, hemos estudiado la evolución por países y 
hemos incorporado una perspectiva más amplia utilizando datos anuales para periodos de al-
rededor de veinte años . Los resultados confirman, en general, lo observado por Eichengreen y 
O’Rourke y por otros autores que se han ocupado de la evolución de la actividad industrial en 
estos años . Sin embargo, nuestro enfoque nos permite hacer hincapié en dos elementos que 
creemos que deberían ser incorporados al debate: el desarrollo real del sector industrial (espe-
cialmente del subsector manufacturero) en los años que precedieron a cada crisis y el estadio de 
desarrollo en el que se encontraba el paradigma tecnológico vigente al iniciarse la contracción .
PalabraS Clave: Historia económica comparativa, Actividad industrial, Gran Depresion, 
Gran Recesión . Códigos JEL: N-10, E-23, N-60 .
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